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Abstract: The paper starts with the proposal that the cause of the apparent insolu-
bility of the free-will problem are several popular but strongly metaphysical notions
and hypotheses. To reduce the metaphysics, some ideas are borrowed from physics.
A concept of event causality is discussed. The importance of Hume’s Principle of
Causality is stressed and his Principle of Causation is weakened. The key concept
of the paper, the so-called relative freedom, is also suggested by physics. It is a
kind of freedom that can be observed everywhere in nature. Turning to biology,
incomplete knowledge is defined for all organisms. They cope with the problem by
Popper’s trial and error processes. One source of their success is the relative freedom
of choice from the basic option ranges: mutations, motions and neural connections.
Finally, the conjecture is adopted that communicability can be used as a criterion
of consciousness and free will is defined as a conscious version of relative freedom.
The resulting notion is logically self-consistent and it describes an observable phe-
nomenon that agrees with our experience.
Key words: physics; causality; free will; memory; consciousness; incomplete knowl-
edge; trial and error
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1 Introduction
If anything happens, we have the tendency to ask two questions: ’What is the cause
of it?’ and ’What am I to do?’ The questions originate in some deep (perhaps
unconscious) convictions. The first is that every event must have a cause and the
second that we can influence things by a suitably chosen action. In our practical life,
the resulting two activities go hand in hand. For example, the knowledge of causes
and effects improves our ability to choose actions so that they have the results we
desire.
However, if we try to build a serious theory that would provide a more exact
formulation of the convictions as well as underpin and explain them, we run into
well-known difficulties.
To formulate the first conviction, most thinkers arrive at the principle (Platon,
Timaios):
Everything what happens must happen by a cause because it is impos-
sible that anything comes into being without cause.
A more recent formulation is that by Laplace (1820):
An intellect which at any given moment knew all the forces that animate
Nature and the mutual positions of the beings that comprise it, if this
intellect were wast enough to submit its data to analysis, could condense
into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the uni-
verse and that of the lightest atom: for such intellect nothing would be
uncertain; and the future just like the past would be present before its
eyes.
This principle is called determinism; it gives a more exact formulation of the first
conviction. The antithesis of determinism is that there are events that do not have
causes. We shall call such events random. The antithesis has become popular in
physics by the influence of quantum mechanics. A question is, how it can be made
compatible with our tendency to look for causes.
A more detailed formulation of the second conviction and of the problem to
understand it is the following (Double 1991):
Any acceptable explication of free will:
1. must entail that free person could have chosen otherwise,
2. must explicate the control that free will requires,
3. must explicate the ”sensibleness” or ”rationality” that free will in-
volves.
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.The first point assumes that there is a range of options from which one chooses.
An important question is which conditions determine the range. An opinion that is
often met can be characterized by adding the words ’all other conditions remaining
the same’ (Searle (1984), P. 95) to the first point. More precisely, these conditions,
which we denote by (A), can be formulated as follows
. . . given the total state of ourselves and the world at the time along with
the laws of nature, it is open to us to do one thing next and open to us
to do another instead.
(Mele (2001), P. 135).
The ’control’ mentioned by the second point requires that the choice from the
range of options ought to be ’up to us’. An example of a theoretical idea that
explains more precisely what this means is Mele’s (2001, P. 211) ’ultimate control
over x-ing by S’ , where S is an agent and x is an action (even a mental one): A
cause of S’s x-ing at t that includes no event or state internal to S does not exist
at any time before t. For example, the causal chain that ends in x-ing ought not to
start before S was born.
Determinism and its antithesis are examples of theoretical hypotheses while con-
dition (A) and the ultimate control are theoretical notions. Theoretical hypotheses
and notions are necessary if we are going to construct a theory that brings our ex-
perience in order and explains it. There is, however, one rather disturbing feature
that the above hypotheses and notions have in common.
For example, determinism does not imply any specific observable effects. If we
cannot identify a cause of any event, then there is always the excuse that the cause
exists but is too elusive to be seen. Hence, determinism can be neither proved nor
disproved by any observational data1.
Similarly conditions (A): How is an experimenter to recognize and describe, what
the total state of the world is? How could he/she reconstruct it at some other time
t′ in order to make some results reproducible? This is likely to be impossible even
in principle.
The hypotheses and notion with such a weak relations to experience are often
called metaphysical. Moreover, it seems that the above metaphysical ideas can be
identified as the source of the well-known difficulties. An example (Kane 2005) is
the following. Under conditions (A) determinism leaves only one option so that
nobody could have chosen otherwise. The antithesis of determinism may allow for a
1Determinism is different from the hypothesis that each event from a specific class C is a cause
of an event from a specific class E. In fact, most scientific laws have such a form. They can be
tested (but cannot be proven).
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non-trivial set of options under the same conditions but there is no control: nobody
can influence random events.
We shall utilize what may be called the scientific methods (for more detail see
Popper 1972). One idea thereof is the primacy of observational data. Scientific
notions ought to possess sufficiently strong observational aspects and scientific hy-
potheses ought to imply sufficiently specific observable consequences, the so-called
predictions, which enable us to test them. Another requirement is the reproducibility
of results so that they may be tested at different times and by different researchers.
Thus, we must keep metaphysics in reasonable limits.
In the first part of the paper, we ask whether the science, in particular the physics,
can make do without determinism and what notion could replace it. Moreover,
we would like to see, whether the well-known scientific laws can admit any kind
of freedom. In Sec. 2, we find that even Newton mechanics allows some freedom
because it cannot be reduced just to its dynamical equations. Only after a system
and its initial state is chosen, the motion is determined uniquely by the equations.
In quantum mechanics, a similar freedom of choice is augmented by the statistical
character of the theory. This means that the dynamical laws do not determine the
processes uniquely even if a system and its initial state are both fixed. We shall also
see how random events and choices can be made compatible with (classical) general
relativity. We introduce the important notion of uniqueness of history and show
that space-times of general relativity can be interpreted as histories of completed
time evolutions.
In Sec. 3, the resulting theory of causality is briefly described. The so-called event
causality is shown to be sufficient for all purposes of physics. The time reversibility
of dynamical equations is explained. This helps to understand the fact that the
causality relation of two events is necessarily oriented and that there is no need
to introduce new notions such as that of state causality. According to Hume, we
distinguish the causation principle from the causality principle. We try to weaken
the causation principle in agreement with the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics. The structure of the causality principle is found to involve a kind of
conditions, which we shall call relevant conditions. The important feature of relevant
conditions is that their occurrence can be recognized by observations. With each
fixed set of relevant conditions, a definite option range is associated. Such a range
represents a relative freedom, i.e., freedom with respect to the relevant conditions.
Relative freedoms are observable phenomena and can be encountered in physics,
biology and psychology.
Then we turn to biology in Sec. 4 and find that, in a unique and well-defined sense,
living organisms are more flexible than certain class of automata. The flexibility is
based on Popper’s concept of trial-and-error processes (see Popper 1972, Chap. 6,
4
On Clouds and Clocks). One of the fundamental features of living beings is the
presence of some form of memory. We assume understanding of memory such as
given in the book by Squire & Kandel (1999). An important fact about living beings
is incomplete knowledge as represented in their memory. This leads to the existence
of the so-called unforeseen events. Trial-and-error is the method by means of which
living organisms cope with unforeseen events. We describe the ranges of options—
mutations, motions and neural connections—that underlie choice of trials and we
give the account of the corresponding relative freedoms.
Free will with the three properties listed above seems to be a natural part of
this biological theory. Its only special feature is some conscious component. Sec. 5
conjectures that communicability can be used as a criterion of consciousness. This
has some interesting consequences for the role of consciousness in free will. Relevant
observations and experiments such as Libet’s (2002) are re-interpreted accordingly.
2 Physics
It may be surprising how much the study of physics and its methods will help us to
understand and clarify the notion of freedom.
2.1 Newton mechanics
We start the discussion with Newton mechanics and its structure. To describe the
structure, a few abstract and general notions are needed: the system, the dynamical
equation and the state.
The system in Newton mechanics consists of a given number of particles with
given masses, on which given forces act. After a system is chosen the theory de-
termines its dynamical equation. To obtain a unique motion, a state of the system
must be chosen at a given instant of time, mostly at the beginning of the motion and
then evolved by the dynamical equation. A state is determined if the coordinates
and velocities of all particles are given.
The choices of a system and a state are not restricted by the theory. These
freedoms are usually understood in a passive sense. For instance, the freedom of state
is seen as the applicability of the dynamical equation to many different situations in
which a system may be found in nature. Similarly for the freedom in the number of
particles, their masses and the forces. It looks like a paradox but it is just logical:
the more general a law is the more choice it admits.
Can we go a step further and interpret the choices of a system and a state as an
active freedom of physicists? Such an assumption could be formulated as follows:
Physicists are free to choose a system from a broad class of systems and a state of the
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system from a broad class of the system states. Then, they can construct this system
in this state in a laboratory at an arbitrary time. However, the words ’physicists are
free’ have only a vague meaning here, they are expressing an impression rather than
an established fact. We shall try to make it clearer in Sec. 3.
The impression seems to be always possessed by experimental physicists (disre-
gard the possible lack of funds). In any case it is not only compatible with empirical
praxis as well as with everyday laboratory work but the experimental freedom seems
to be a tacit assumptions made by scientists generally. Mathematics and physics
are often taught or understood as rigid and ’dead’ sets of rules. This is not how
these sciences are actually done!
If we assume that the world in its entirety can be reduced to a system of massive
particles and forces between them so that all properties of all objects could be
calculated from their mechanical parameters according to Newton mechanics then
the future or past state of the world is uniquely determined by its state at the present
time. This is the origin of Laplace’s formulation of determinism.
According to our contemporary understanding, the assumption that the world
can be described, in all its detail and in its entirety, by Newton mechanics is wrong.
Thus, the theoretical support for determinism provided by it has broken down. Still,
Newton mechanics is a good approximation in many cases and this makes it an alive
and often used theory even today.
2.2 Quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics has the same basic structure as Newton mechanics. Again,
there is an affluence of various quantum systems. With each system a dynamical
equation and a set of states is associated. Given a state at a time instant, then the
state at any other time can be calculated from it by the dynamical equation and is
unique.
The choice of system and state is not restricted by any rule in quantum mechanics
either. The only difference is that the active version of it is explicitly formulated in
some textbooks of quantum mechanics (see, e.g., Peres 1995, P.50).
The nature of the states of quantum systems is, however, very different from
that of their Newton counterparts. They must enable a new feature, namely the
statistical character of quantum mechanics. Given a fixed state of a system and a
quantity that is measurable on the system, then its repeated measurements generally
give different results even if both the state and the measurement are the same. Only
the probability distribution of the results can be calculated from the state.
More precisely, a quantum experiment looks as follows. It consists of a number of
individual measurements. In each measurement, we obtain a single quantum system
(for example a photon) from a source (a laser, say), which is some macroscopic
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apparatus. The macroscopic structure of the source determines the quantum state of
the system obtained from it uniquely. The (macroscopic) arrangement of the source
and the measuring apparatus (for example a photographic plate), which is again
a macroscopic system, is the same for each measurement. In each measurement,
we obtain a certain value (for example a position) which can be read off at the
measuring apparatus (for example, as a black point at the plate). If the experiment
contains sufficiently many measurements then the frequencies of the values obtained
are well approximated by the probabilities calculated from the state.
It is very important to notice that everything done by an experimenter is to ma-
nipulate and observe macroscopic devices. Quantum mechanics only identifies the
cause of the distribution of the measured values: it is the choice of both a source and
a measuring apparatus. But it does not specify any cause for a particular measure-
ment giving this and not another value. As the values are visible by naked eye on a
macroscopic body, it is the macroscopic behaviour that is not always predictable.
2.3 General relativity
Can the existence of random events and choices be included into a coherent picture
of the whole world? In particular, is it compatible with the rest of physics? We
have seen that Newton mechanics is only valid in a restricted domain so that its
deterministic character does not prevent random events elsewhere.
However, there is another modern theory called general relativity. It describes the
world on large scale. An important theoretical concept of general relativity is that of
space-time: a four dimensional manifold carrying a Lorentzian metric and containing
matter. The structure of general relativity is similar to that of Newton theory.
It admits a number of different space-times, there are states forming certain sets
that are different for different space-times and space-times must satisfy a dynamical
equation.
The large scale character of general relativity is important if we are to compare
it with Newton or quantum mechanics. There does not seem to be much choice of
a system if the theory intends to describe the whole universe. Moreover, we cannot
require from physicists to set up an arbitrary state of the world in their laboratory
at an arbitrary instant of time. However, we can say that different space-times
represent different models of the universe.
The next problem is that there is no mark on a space-time that would distinguish
the present instant and there is no difference between the general structures of past
and future (this is similar to Newton mechanics). The usual interpretation is to say
that this difference is purely subjective and that the present instant may be anywhere
depending on where observers happens to be. The space-time is considered as an
observer-independent description of the macroscopic world for all times.
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However, the picture of time that follows from the existence of random events
is dominated by an asymmetry between future and past. The future does not yet
exist and more possibilities are open to it. The past is fixed because the choice of
the possibilities is done only at present instants of time. Such an asymmetry is not
new in philosophy, see, e.g., Popper (1974).
Consider the past. It can exist only as a memory or another kind of record
that an observer, or a family of observers, can make about the observations done
within each of their progressing presences. Only in this indirect way does the past
have to do with reality. The past as a (processed) record is in principle fixed in
all aspects and details. There are two very different reasons for that. First, the
choice between free alternatives has been done and no change is possible any more.
Second, we usually suppose that different observations or observations by different
observers concerning the choices can finally be put into an agreement. This is a
rather non trivial hypothesis on which, in fact, all of the science is based. We call this
hypothesis uniqueness of history. It has a natural explanation in the philosophical
realism (Russell 1959); for a more contemporary discussion of realism, see John
Searle’s (2004) analysis in Chap. 10.
As for the future, its very existence is a hypothesis based on the analysis and
extrapolation of the past. Similarly, we can extrapolate the existence of various
structures and the validity of laws found in the past. Since there are also unpre-
dictable aspects, one can say that some part of the world is newly created (Popper
1974: ’chosen by nature’) at each present instant of time, another part is determined
by the past.
Now, we can give the answer to the question of how space-times of general relativ-
ity are to be interpreted: Any space-time is just a hypothetical past of a completed
time evolution (Ellis 2006). (A space-time can be viewed as one possibility for a
complete evolution of universe including definite random choices made at each time).
The problem of asymmetry between future and past then does not arise because we
are working only with pasts. If we accept this change in the interpretation of general
relativity, then the existence of random events becomes compatible with the whole
of the contemporary physics.
3 Causality
3.1 Event causality
Causality and some related notions are very important in discussions about freedom.
In this section, a theory motivated by physics is described. It also defines our
dictionary and tries to prevent confusion caused by the fact that different texts use
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the same words in different meanings.
Let us start by stipulating that causality concerns primarily relations between
events. An event will be understood as what happens at roughly one point and at
one time (more precisely, in a small space-time neighbourhood). Thus, an event is
not just a small space-time neighbourhood but something must also happen there.
This kind of causality is often called event causality. Other kinds of causality can
be found in literature. For example, the structure of a system is considered as the
cause of its properties. It is not clear in how much this has to do with a logical
reason rather than with a physical cause. In any case, such important relations can
be accounted for under the heading of models and theories, not under causality, and
so they will not be lost. Another example of causal relation that is not a relation
between events is the so-called ’agent causation’ (Kane 2005) that occurs in some
philosophical texts on free will. We shall not need it.
Event causality is sometimes criticized (e.g., Campbell (1957), P. 66) as a naive,
pre-scientific kind of causality and the causality which is met in the modern field
theories is described in a different way: the state of a field at an instant of time is the
cause of another state at a later, or even earlier, time instant (state causality). Of
course, the state of a field at a time is not an event but we can consider such a state
as a set of events2. Indeed, to describe such a state, the values of some measurable
quantities must be given at all points of space at a given time, and the fact that
these values occur at various space-time points is nothing but a set of events in our
sense.
The time reversibility of some dynamical equations is also considered as a diffi-
culty for event causality, which distinguishes cause from effect and is, in this sense,
oriented. A short reflection however shows that the reversibility of dynamical equa-
tions does not mean the reversibility of the relation of cause and effect even for state
causality. It is true that we can often reconstruct the state at an earlier moment
if we know the state at a later one. But this is a logical reconstruction. Indeed,
we cannot change the state in the past by manipulating the state at the present.
The re-constructibility may be interesting in that it can be considered as a criterion
of completeness of the event sets which one has to do with. Complete means here
that the set is equivalent to a state, because else the states at other instants of time
would not be uniquely determined.
Further discussion of the reversibility needs a clarification of the meaning of this
concept first. Indeed, it definitely does not mean that the time flow can be inverted.
At most, the order of some aspects of a possible motion can be inverted so that
another possible motion results. For example, in Newton mechanics, the coordinates
2Even in quantum mechanics, any specific preparation of a state can be considered as a set of
(macroscopic) events.
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as functions of time t describe a trajectory of a motion. One can substitute −t
for t into the functions and another possible trajectory will result (if the forces
are time-reversal invariant). Now, the states of Newton mechanics are completely
determined only if both coordinates and velocities are given. But the velocities at
the corresponding points after time reversal are not the same as before, they must
also be inverted. Hence, the same states are not running in the reverse order if
we ’reverse time’ and the final state of the original motion cannot be the cause of
its initial state. To summarize, it seems that some version of event causality is an
adequate notion, and it is even more satisfactory for physics than various reversible
state causalities. Let us elaborate on the corresponding causal relation in more
detail.
A causal relation is an oriented relation between a set of events A called the cause,
and an event B, called the effect. If A occurs, B must also do (A is called by some
philosophers ’sufficient cause’). For example, in Newton mechanics, the elements of
a cause A can be values xi
n
of the three coordinates and velocities x˙i
n
, i = 1, 2, 3,
for all particles n = 1, 2, · · · , N at some time t. Then, B can be certain pair xi
n
, x˙i
n
concerning n-th particle and i-th coordinate axis at a time t′ larger than t. If we
take all such B’s at the time t′, then we have a complete system of effects so that
we can reconstruct A. This suggests that we can collect several effects of the same
cause in a set and call this set also an effect of the cause. But, unlike causes, the
composed effects seem to be always decomposable into their event elements.
Locality means in physics that causes always precede their effects in time, t(A) <
t(B). In modern physics, this mostly implies that the effect must lie in the future
light cone of the cause: causing does not travel with a velocity larger than the speed
of the light. There are some exceptions, but these are always due to some special
circumstances that can be detected. For example, in the case of super-luminal
group velocities in some media etc., see Liberati, Sonego & Visser (2002), there
always seems to be an inertial frame where no effects precede their causes, such as
the rest frame of the medium.
3.2 Principle of causality
Thinking about causality was strongly influenced by Hume (1992). Hume distin-
guished two hypotheses: the principle of causality, which states that like causes have
like effects, and the principle of causation, which maintains that there is no event
without cause. Hume also listed all properties of the causal relation given above.
The principle of causality seems to be the most important part of the theory
because without it the observation of causal phenomena would be impossible. Let
us try to give the principle a more precise form. First, we say ’equivalent’ instead
of ’like’: equivalent causes and equivalent effects form classes that are determined
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by some conditions.
Physics and its ways can help to understand the conditions. First, the objects
which physicists work with are called systems. Systems usually come in many copies
and there is some way to recognize that two systems are equivalent.
Second, physicists study systems under specific conditions that must be repro-
ducible (in a laboratory, say) or at least recognizable and often encountered (in
astrophysics, say). The conditions should not in general contain the time and the
position. This enables us to observe equivalent causes at different times and posi-
tions and to check that there is a pattern. That is, observations can be repeated in
order to confirm or extend previous results. We also assume that every occurrence
of such conditions consists of a set of events. The conditions do not have any special
name in physics, but for our purposes it is advantageous to give them one. Let
this be relevant conditions because they are indeed relevant for the study or the
experiment.
In fact, the notion of relevant conditions is the basic tool of our understanding the
world around us. All laws of nature have been discovered by looking what happens
if some relevant conditions occur repeatedly. In this way, each particular causal
relation becomes an instantiation of a general law of nature3.
The science makes a heavy use of relevant conditions for example in its experimen-
tal methods. The experiments are to be reproducible and so their conditions have to
be defined carefully. It seems, however, that the recognizability and reproducibility
of the conditions is never absolute; there is no absolutely clean experiment. There
always seem to be uncontrolled influences; in any case, repeated experiments always
give some dispersion of numerical values. The lack of an absolute control about the
purity of the conditions can be quantified by the dispersion (mean squared devia-
tion). In practice, one views a control as excellent if the dispersion is sufficiently
small.
3.3 Principle of causation
Let us turn to the principle of causation. Historically, this is a very old principle. For
example, almost the same words were used by Hume and Platon (see the Introduc-
tion). From the principle of causation, it follows that we could predict everything
that happens in the future of a time instant, if we knew all kinds of causes and if we
knew everything that happened in the past of the time—determinism. Determinism
can also be described as follows: Given the complete state of the whole universe at
3Causal relations and laws of nature cannot be proved by pure logic from pure observational
evidence. This was also shown by Hume. We can agree with Hume by saying that they remain
only more or less probable hypotheses, but we still maintain that this does not make them useless.
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a time instant t, then there is only one possible way of how the universe evolves in
the future or past of t.
It has been explained in the Introduction that the principle of causation and
the associated determinism cannot be proved or disproved. What we can control in
physical experiments with, and in observations of, a system is always only a tiny part
of the universe so that we can recognize if it satisfies some relevant conditions. A
system subjected to given relevant conditions exhibits a behaviour. If the conditions
are repeated, the system can show the same or a different behaviour. In this way,
one can find a number of alternative possibilities that are open to the system under
the given conditions. If, after many repetitions, no new possibilities occur we can
assume, that they have all been found. Such a complete system of possibilities is
called option range. The existence of the options can, therefore, be experimentally
tested. The knowledge about specific option ranges form an important part of
science.
Most contemporary physicists simply assume what we call the Weak Causation
Principle (WCP) and what we can formulate as follows: Every event is an element
of an option range determined by some maximal relevant conditions.
Relevant conditions are called maximal if adding any further condition does not
decrease the number of options. If the corresponding option range contains only one
element we have a causal relation of the usual type. But WCP admits also cases
when the range contains more alternative possibilities. The existence of such cases
is assumed by the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. WCP does not
comprise much more than just what experience tells us but it is sufficiently strong
to explain our search for causes, interesting relevant conditions and option ranges.
After about 80 years of quantum mechanics, WCP seems to be a simpler and
more comfortable hypothesis than the determinism. To introduce additional causes
(in quantum mechanics, the so-called hidden variables) into the theory makes it
technically more complicated. Moreover, in this way, something is introduced that
does not have even an indirect relation to what can be observed today. By Occam’s
razor, we are better to abstain. If evidence will emerge sometimes in the future that
will have any relevance to the problem, it will most likely be very different from
anything what we could imagine in our wildest dreams today. However, it is not
true that quantum mechanics has proven determinism to be wrong.
3.4 The notion of relative freedom
The uniqueness of history makes determinism impossible to disprove and freedom
difficult to see. Still, physical experiments show the way of how a rational notion
of option ranges can be introduced. Crucial is the concept of relevant conditions.
They are weaker than conditions (A) mentioned in the Introduction and posses a
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closer relation to observational data.
We can define: If a system has an option range that contains more than one
element under some fixed relevant conditions, then we say that it has a freedom
relative to the conditions, a relative freedom. Hence, one and the same system
can have several different relative freedoms depending on the choice of the relevant
conditions.
Our definition of option ranges does not mention the way in which its alternative
possibilities are realized. It can be an effect of a cause that lies outside the relevant
conditions (then the conditions are not maximal) or it need not have any cause.
The way of the realization of a fixed option may even differ in different cases of its
realization. The existence of relative freedoms itself contradicts neither the existence
of causes nor that of random events.
Let us stress that relevant conditions may define an important and useful relative
freedom even if they are not maximal. An example is connected with the so-called
emergent phenomena. These are properties of complex systems that cannot be de-
rived exclusively from the properties of its individual constituents. The possibilities
of how given constituents can combine form an option range. Consider for instance
electrons, protons and neutrons. They can combine into about one hundred stable
atoms that in turn can combine into zillions of stable molecules, crystals and mix-
tures. This is a huge option range, which underlies the surprising wealth of structure
in nature.
A noteworthy example of non-maximal relevant conditions is the relative freedom
that is associated with each scientific law such as dynamical equations in physics.
Indeed, the more general a law is, the larger the number of individual cases can be
ruled by it. If we define the relevant conditions as the applicability of the law, then
the individual cases form the option range of a relative freedom. The ability to use
the law entails a deep knowledge of this freedom.
We now have a better understanding of the impression about the freedom of
physicists referred to in the subsections on Newton and quantum mechanics. There
are relevant conditions: to have a well-equipped physical laboratory, full stop. There
is an option range: all mechanical or quantum mechanical systems that can be
constructed in the laboratory and all states, in which the systems can be created.
First, it is clear that the statement can be given an arbitrarily rigorous form, second,
it expresses exactly the freedom that is necessary to do physics and, finally, it seems
that it is an adequate explanation of the freedom impression of the physicists.
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4 Biology
Let us define the living organisms provisionally by counting, just taking over the
existing listing and taxonomy. Experience shows that living beings all have what we
can call elementary needs: they feed, they reproduce and they avert or avoid danger
(we understand these words in a sufficiently general sense so that they also apply
to all living organisms). Then, their behaviour can be understood as ultimately
motivated by the elementary needs. There is therefore what can be called teleonomy.
The teleonomy is ’built in the genes’. An account of it is given by Monod (1970).
Of course, there are organisms that have much more sophisticated motivations.
It seems, however, that the ’higher’ motivations can be understood as derived needs,
needs that have their origin in strategies serving to satisfy the elementary needs.
For example, some animal species are gregarious, and it is more or less clear, how
a suitable way of life in a group makes feeding, reproduction and averting dangers
easier or even possible in a given niche. Then, seeking, gaining and keeping a suitable
position in a group may be understood as a derived need.
Another important property of the known living organisms is that they are more
flexible than the machines that follow fixed algorithms. A generally used math-
ematical model of such a machine is the so-called Turing (1937) machine. From
the biological point of view we can describe an algorithm as follows: it determines
specific responses to specific stimuli and there is a fixed list of the stimuli (a list of
the responses is determined by the organism)4. In our language of conditions and
options, we can say that there are conditions—identified with always one specific
stimulus of the list—that possess only one option, a response from the other list.
To be sure, the behaviour of all living organisms including people follows in some
stages some such program. Let us call it routine. However, the strategies of living
species are not exhausted by routines. On the other hand, we do not claim that it is
impossible to construct a machine that is as flexible as a living organism. Observe
that the lists of stimuli and reactions represent information, e.g., some knowledge
about how the stimuli are related to the elementary needs.
Suppose that an event occurs that is not in the list of stimuli, but it none the
less still has relation to the elementary needs. Let us call such an event unforeseen.
We leave open whether an unforeseen event has had a cause or not. The existence
of unforeseen events can be interpreted as an instance of incomplete knowledge: the
knowledge is missing that concerns both the link of the unforeseen event to the
elementary needs and the way in which this link can be used for a suitable reaction.
4Even (artificial) neural networks (see e.g. Churchland (1995)) that are capable of learning can
be simulated on digital computers, i.e., in principle on Turing machines. The reason is that they
can only learn to associate a response from a fixed closed list with a stimulus from another fixed
closed list.
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The memory of an organism does not contain any direct representation of such
knowledge.
The flexibility means that all species are equipped with facilities (body structures)
that enable them to reprogram the routines if some unforeseen events occur. An
important property of unforeseen events is that there does not exist any list of them.
Hence, a solution to such a problem cannot be programmed in the way Turing
machines work. A general procedure serving this purpose that can be observed
in all living beings has been highlighted by Popper (1972), who has called it the
’trial-and-error method’. The same principles have been applied by Edelman (1987)
just to the way brains are working. However, his ’neural Darwinism’ is aimed at
perceptual categorization, generalization and memory rather than at free will.
In our language of conditions and options, we can give the following account of the
’method’. Consider an organism such as a mouse and let some specific conditions
contain an unforeseen event and let the conditions allow some range of options
for the mouse response. Then, the mouse that is confronted with the conditions
must be able to make choices from the range. Let us call the procedure of such
choice realization. The realization process may be random or causal or something
in between—this is irrelevant for our theory. The ability to perform the realization
process needs freedom that is possessed by all living beings. Pointedly said, it is
the liberty to err. After each choice, the mouse perceives what happens. Often,
the result is negative (error). The next time when the conditions occur, the mouse
makes another choice. And so on, until the result is positive. The good choice may
then be remembered and the routine thus reprogrammed. This part of the procedure
is called selection.
It is clear that a necessary condition for the procedure of trial and error to work
is some kind of memory. The errors have to be remembered so that they will not be
repeated. The selections have to be remembered, in order that they will be chosen.
And indeed, some kind of memory is the most important part of any living being.
Our theory of biological freedom explains the frequent observation that structures
evolved to serve certain needs are subsequently used for very different puposes. Let
us now look to see how it works in more detail.
4.1 Mutations
The most basic kind of memory in biology is an inheritance molecule such as the
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and the basic option range in biology is formed by
mutations. Its alternative possibilities are the changes in the DNA. Mutations come
about in a realization process that may work all the time (as, e.g., for bacteria)
or during specific periods (meiosis for sexually reproducing organisms; a generally
understandable description thereof is Dawkins 1989) and it seems to be random.
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If the option range is wide enough then some of its possibilities are advantageous
for the mutated organism in the sense that they lead to the proliferation of individ-
uals with this mutations and to relative suppression of the others. In this way, the
selection process works. As a rule, the selection is not random and causes can be
found for most selections.
Observe that the unforeseen event can be answered only if it comes after the
suitable mutation is established and remembered. For example, if a new antibiotic
is applied to a bacterial infection, there must already be bacteria with a suitable
mutation. Thus, in the special case of mutations, the unforeseen events themselves
take part in the selection process.
4.2 Neuron connections
Some multicellular organisms such as animals possess an option range with alter-
native possibilities called motions. Parts of the animal’s body, e.g., trunks, legs or
eyes, can take different relative positions without inhibiting other functions of the
body. The relevant conditions are simply the internal anatomy and physiology of
the body as well as the external circumstances that allow changes of such positions.
Animal motions are usually organized with the help of the nervous system. Prop-
erties of nervous systems are important for us but a simplified picture that follows
will be sufficient. Much more detailed neurology supporting our approach can be
found in Edelman’s (1987) ’theory of neural groups selection.’
Experiments show that certain nerve signals trigger certain motions. Sequences
of motions such as running or flying are brought about by specialized sets of nerves
connected in a particular way. Influence of sensory data on motions is made possible
by connections of other sets of nerves. The connections of neurons can thus code
for processes containing motions and can themselves be considered as a memory.
Some neural structures are inherited: the connections are built up according to the
DNA blueprint. This kind of memory serves for routines and cannot be used for
trial-and-error processes. The connections have been selected by the process based
on the mutations and the contents of the neural memory is equivalent to a part of
the DNA.
Other connections of neurons can, however, be altered also during the life of an
individual organism. Let us consider changes enabled by the so-called synapses.
The alternative possibilities of how the strengths of synapses can be chosen form an
important option range for animals. The relevant conditions here are the positions
and variation range of all flexible synapses. The simplest example of such an option
range and a memory based on it can be recognized in the learning by invertebrates
as described by Squire & Kandel (1999). There are three kinds of such learning:
habituation, sensitization and classical conditioning. Let us look at the habituation.
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The other two kinds of simple learning are of similar nature.
Let some new stimulus that does not carry any danger by itself cause some kind of
alarm response by an animal. In this case, we can arrange a training session in which
this stimulus is occurring more often without being followed by anything harmful.
Then, the response becomes gradually weaker until it practically disappears. This is
first remembered only for a short time of, say, ten minutes. If the training sessions
are repeated sufficiently many times over a sufficiently long time, then the new
reaction can be remembered for a longer time, such as several weeks.
The connectivity of the neurons as well as the physical and chemical processes
in the synapses that are necessary for such learning are well understood. We can
describe the learning in our language in agreement with these neurological details.
The relevant conditions are the occurrence of the stimulus and no harmful event
following it (the unforeseen event). The options are the degrees of alarm. The
realization process is carried out by the chemistry of the synapses and is rather
systematic: the degree of alarm is approximately decreasing. Observe the important
role of the repeated occurrence of relevant conditions so that an animal can perceive
what its trials are leading to. The no-alarm option is selected after a chain of sensory
inputs. What has been learnt is a specific response to a specific stimulus. This is
not just a kind of ’second-order’ Turing machine: true, a response to a stimulus
chain is a change of a response to a stimulus. But, as it was already stressed, there
is no list of unforeseen events. The method is trial-and-error.
More advanced kind of learning and trial-and-error processes are enabled by the
so-called declarative memory. It needs a collaboration of two complex nervous struc-
tures: the cortex and the hippocampus. Consider for example the experiments with
rats in the Morris water maze (Squire & Kandel 1999). This is a large circular pool
with murky water and steep walls that cannot be climbed by the animal. Under the
water not at the centre of the pool, a slightly submerged platform is hidden.
The rats are put into the water at some fixed position in the pool. The subsequent
chaotic motion of a rat in searching for something (it does not know about the
platform) has the character of a trial-and-error process. The options are nervous
signals that code for and trigger different possible swimming motions. We do not
need to know in detail the nature of these signals and simply call them portable
neural representations (PNR). They seem to occur in a rat’s brain in a more or less
random way. Some of them may be related to some stimulus from outside as well
as from the rat’s memory. The realized PNR’s that lead to motions are the trials of
the process. Finally, the successful PNR representing a more or less direct swim to
the platform is selected and remembered.
After this training, the experiment is modified in order to see what kind of knowl-
edge has been acquired about the location of the platform. There are two groups
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of rats: those with healthy hippocampus and those with lesions there. The rats of
both groups are able to swim directly to the platform from the position where they
have been always put into the water during the training. Next, the rats have to
start from another position in the pool. It turns out that the normal rats swim to
the platform from any position without searching while those with lesions have to
fall back on trial and error.
To explain these observations, one possible assumption is that the healthy rats
acquire more knowledge about the layout of the room than the others. The knowl-
edge is in the form of a PNR that somehow represents the layout. It is possible in
principle because the room with the pool is not rotationally symmetric: its walls
carry some cues. The layout PNR can be used by the rats to work out the suitable
motion from the sensory data on where they have been put into the water. If this
calculation takes the form of a purely mental trial-and-error process (see Edelman
1987), then the new starting position is an unforeseen event and what the healthy
rat does is not a routine. If not, then the healthy rats have simply learned a better
kind of routine than the others.
Another hypothesis is that the acquired layout PNR is similar for both groups
but the rats with lesions cannot work out from it the correct motion. There are two
possibilities. First, the purely mental trial-and-error process cannot be performed
without hippocampus. Second, the routine calculation cannot be done so. In this
case, the lesser calculation ability has the same effect as the incomplete knowledge.
By the way, we observe that none of the rats chooses to swim merrily around
instead of searching for something. They apparently have an inbuilt dislike for
staying in water that has some connection to their elementary needs.
5 Freedom of will
The freedom of will is usually understood as the ability to choose consciously an idea
of an action and then carry out the action accordingly. The general notion also agrees
with free will having the three properties listed by Double (see the Introduction).
In this section, we try to construct a theory explaining these points.
Clearly, the choice is only possible if there is an option range corresponding
to some conditions. Our main idea is to replace conditions (A) by the relevant
conditions. In this way, our theory of free will becomes a part of the general biological
theory described in the previous section. The only new feature that makes a relative
freedom to free will is a suitable conscious component.
As for ideas, we assume that each is associated with a portable neural represen-
tative5.
5The ideas are mental states or processes and PNR are neural states and processes. We accept
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The nature and role of consciousness and how the consciousness is represented
by neural processes in the brain is not known. However, some incomplete and
phenomenological understanding might be sufficient for our purposes. In particular,
an important criterion of consciousness is the communicability: a conscious idea, or
that an idea is conscious, can be told to others. In fact, this criterion is crucial for
the experimental work done e.g. by Libet: there is no way experimentalists can be
informed on consciousness of another person independent of what the person tells
them.
There are various phenomenological hypotheses on consciousness. Some surpris-
ing observational data (see Wegner 2002) suggest (but do not prove) the conjecture
that consciousness is only an epiphenomenon. If this were true, then the free will
in our sense would still exist: we could define it as conscious experience of relative
freedoms. However, it seems that the data admit a stronger conjecture.
If we adopt the communicability criterion, then it follows that consciousness helps
us actively to carry out complex mental work. A necessary component of such a work
is a formulation of partial results from time to time in a way that is understandable
to others even if no communication is planned. This must be conscious according
to the criterion. The purpose is to check that nothing has been forgotten and that
the whole is logically coherent. We can thus try the more general conjecture that
consciousness provides active and manifold help with thinking. It is also supported
by the observation that consciousness is always experienced in non trivial processes
of thinking. Moreover, it explains why brains with consciousness have advantage
over those without and why they, therefore, would evolve at all.
As free will is concerned, the conscious component in realizing and selecting ideas
carries with it both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it helps think-
ing, on the other, it consumes more energy and time than unconscious processes.
Indeed, the relatively long time needed for conscious processes is an established ob-
servational result (Libet 2004, Wegner 2002). Brain processes consume glucose at a
pretty high rate. This suggests that there is also need for more energy. If conscious
processes in the brain run parallel to unconscious ones or if they entail synchronous
actions of many neurons (Llina´s & Ribary 1993), then they are expensive.
Our experience forces us to admit that unconscious processes take also part in
thinking. What is their role? Let us look more closely at the experiments supporting
the conjecture that actions are chosen unconsciously and that consciousness is only
an accompanying phenomenon. A conspicuous feature of the experiments is that
the actions asked for do not require any complex mental work. For example Libet
the solution of the mind body problem as described in detail by John Searle (2004). Roughly, the
ideas and PNR are different entities, which, however, can be considered as two sides of the same
thing. Similar thoughts can be found already in Fechner (1860) and perhaps even before Fechner.
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asks for the choice of an arbitrary time instant for a simple motion of a wrist.
Hence, a simple alternative interpretation of such experiments is as follows. When
the experiment is running, the unconscious brain does not switch on the conscious-
ness at once because no complicated mental work is needed. It does the choice itself,
only then ’drops a notice’ to the consciousness to enable a possible veto and to the
declarative memory to save it for later, maybe conscious, use.
Let us instead look at the game of chess. This is an activity that clearly needs
non trivial thinking. First, a chess player has motives and desires to play or not
to play a game, to win or not to win as well as some more special tastes of how to
play. Some vague ideas about connections of these thoughts to the elementary needs
could be imagined, but we leave the question open. In any case, we do not require
the origin of the desires to be always a conscious, rational reasoning.
After the decision to play and win and after the start of a game, there are well
defined option ranges: all moves that are allowed by the rules of chess in a given
position. The moves are understood as ideas. Some positions with which a player
is confronted during the game are unforeseen events as defined at the beginning of
Sec. 4.
No chess player is able to calculate the game to the end from most positions;
not even the fastest computer can do this in a reasonable time. The players are
looking for a ’strong’ move that is enabled by some properties of the position. If
they become aware of any such move they calculate the possible consequences of it
to the depth of several moves to check if the idea works. In this way, they learn more
about the position so that after rejecting one idea, they are likely to get another, etc.
It is not allowed to make trial moves with the pieces, hence we have a purely mental
method of trial and error. Conscious processing is influenced by input coming from
the unconscious brain. The players become aware of relations to other games that
they played or studied in the past. The process of selection from trial moves is an
example of process in which the help of consciousness can be experienced at many
intermediate steps.
The final point is that after having calculated the moves and selected among them
with the help of consciousness the act of actually moving a piece may again contain
unconscious elements. Indeed, it is often done in an utterly mechanical way that is
not even remembered. The question whether the conscious mind directly moves the
hand seems to be less important than whether the hand moves in accordance with
the mind plan.
The chess example makes an important point. Consciousness is considered as a
tool helping to choose from option ranges in complicated cases. The manner of its
working as such a tool explains the third point by Double (see the Introduction):
some rational and sensible aspects of free will. Indeed, as we have argued, one of the
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tasks of consciousness is to check that the selection is based on a logically coherent
system of ideas and that it satisfies the desires.
A still stronger conjecture on the role of consciousness is a hypothesis that I
would call the consciousness domination. The idea is that, on the one hand, desires
and motivations are formed rationally in a conscious way and, on the other, that
conscious thoughts can be direct causes for actions. Wegner (2002) had thoroughly
discussed the second part of this hypothesis, which he called the conscious will. He
had drawn on a wealth of experimental and observational data and concluded that
this kind of conscious will is an illusion. Now, the analysis of the chess game shows
that the theory of free will explained in the present paper does not make use of any
part of the consciousness-domination hypothesis.
Let us turn to the second point by Double. A scientific theory of control can
go roughly along the following lines. It starts at the observation that all living
organisms are born with some teleology: there are certain elementary needs that
have to be satisfied. Humans are gregarious animals, with an involved hierarchical
social structure. They need to find, gain and keep a suitable position in society as
was mentioned at the beginning of Sec. 4. The needs are clearly given to us from
nature and are not up to us. But the inbuilt teleology shows only general directions.
In fact, we are overwhelmed by the huge manifold of choices to which different people
are stimulated by their inherited teleology. Let us call the basic choices of this kind
the options of self.
On the one hand, the choices from the options of self are not completely up to us.
Clearly, some of them develop even without our conscious acting through breeding,
education, accidental circumstances, etc. On the other hand, the corresponding
desires and motivations need not even be compatible with each other and one has
to deliberate and choose. Moreover, many of us have the experience of, as it were,
consciously and freely changing a quite essential part of the self after some very
important unforeseen event happens, although such events are rather rare. The
choice must be done in agreement with our feeling of what is the best for us and this
is the basis of some control. Next, a more or less complete, definite and constant
self does not by itself determine uniquely our specific everyday choices. Again, there
can be conflicting desires on the one and different ways of satisfying one desire on
the other hand. The control means that we make our choices in the best possible
accord with our self if an unforeseen event occurs.
If these ideas on control are properly interpreted then they can be recognized as a
part of the teaching on the self in the contemporary psychology, see e.g. Baumeister
(1998). The difference between the present paper and the work of psychologists is
that the research in psychology focuses on patterns of experience and studies the
behaviour that is a consequence of our impression of being free to choose. Hence, a
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lot of useful work can be done without addressing the philosophical problem asso-
ciated with a real free choice. The result is a purely phenomenological theory that
does not explain its basic notions. Some do just that (Baumeister), others interpret
the impression of free choices as an illusion (Wegner).
Our biological definition of free will makes it a phenomenon that is compatible
with all scientific evidence and can be studied by natural sciences on the one hand
and that seems to agree with everyday impression of the freedom as we all know it
on the other. However, only some rough general idea has been be given here and
many details still remain to be elaborated on.
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